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Federal Income Taxation
by Robert A. Beard*
and Gregory S. Lucas*
In 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and courts within its jurisdiction decided a number of important federal
taxation cases. Among these are a case that raises novel constitutional
arguments under the Equal Protection Clause, a case that lodges a
constitutional challenge to the United States Tax Court, and a case that
addresses a matter of first impression in the circuit about the
deductibility of amounts paid in the context of a divorce proceeding.
These three cases are discussed herein.'
I. MORRISSEY V. UNITED STATES
Occasionally, tax disputes implicate the United States Constitution.
Morrissey v. United StateS2 represents one of those occasions, illustrating
the unlikely intersection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
4
Amendment 3 with section 213 of the United States Tax Code (the Code),
5
which allows for a deduction of certain medical expenses.
In 2012, taxpayer Joseph F. Morrissey filed an amended return for the
2011 tax year, claiming a deduction under § 213 for medical expenses

*Senior Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.A., 2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of Florida Frederic
G. Levin College of Law (LL.M., 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B., 2000); University of Chicago (M.A., 2004); University of Chicago (J.D., 2013).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal taxation cases decided during the prior survey period,
see Robert Beard & Gregory S. Lucas, Federal Income Taxation, Eleventh CircuitSurvey,
68 MERCER L. REV. 1041 (2017).
2. 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. I.R.C. § 213 (2018). All "section" references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.
5. Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1262.
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relating to a surrogate pregnancy.6 These medical expenses arose from
Morrissey's own blood work and sperm collection, in the amount of
approximately $1,500, as well as approximately $55,000 Morrissey
incurred in procuring an egg donor and gestational surrogate. These
latter expenses included the costs of identifying prospective donors and
surrogates, paying for their travel and other expenses, and compensating
them, in addition to paying for their direct medical expenses arising from
the egg donation and surrogacy. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
denied Morrissey the refund he claimed, explaining that § 213 does not
permit deductions for the medical expenses of a person other than the
taxpayer or the taxpayer's dependents or spouse. 7 IRS Appeals upheld
this determination, and Morrissey filed a refund suit in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. 8
Morrissey made two arguments at the district court, both of which
were rejected at summary judgment.9 The first argument was that the
plain language of § 213 permits the claimed deduction. The second
argument was that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires the IRS to permit the deduction. Morrissey raised these same
arguments again on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. 10
As for the statutory argument, § 213(a) allows a deduction for expenses
not compensated by insurance or otherwise for the medical care of the
taxpayer, the taxpayer's dependents, or spouse to the extent that the
expenses exceed 10%-7.5% for the year at issue in this case-of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income." Section 213(d) 12 defines "medical
care," specifying that it means amounts paid "[flor the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body."13 Morrissey argued that
the in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment did amount to deductible
medical care because the treatment, although performed on another
person, was "made for the purpose of affecting his body's reproductive
function." 14 This is because Morrissey, a homosexual man, is
physiologically incapable of reproducing with his male partner, and thus,

6. Id. at 1263.
7. Id. at 1263-64.
8. Id. at 1264.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
I.R.C. § 213(a) (2018).
I.R.C. § 213(d) (2018).
I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2018).
Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1265.
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his only means of fathering his own children is through the IVF
procedures.15

The IRS has ruled on various aspects of what constitutes deductible
"medical care." The logic behind some of the distinctions is not always
entirely clear. One revenue ruling explains that both hair transplants
and hair removal are forms of medical care because they affect structures
of the body (the scalp and hair follicles), but tattooing and ear-piercing
are not medical care because they (according to the ruling) do not affect
a structure of the body.16 Although the cosmetic changes achieved by
tattooing and ear-piercing are not medical care, the IRS elsewhere ruled
that a facelift performed for purely cosmetic reasons is medical care.' 7
Expenses need not relate directly to the taxpayer's body (or the body of a
dependent or spouse) to be deductible medical care expenses.
Transportation and lodging expenses can be medical care expenses, as
can be insurance premiums.' 8 Two longstanding revenue rulings hold
that § 213 permits deductions of expenses relating to "[t]he acquisition,
training, and maintenance of a dog for the purpose of assisting a
dependent who is deaf."' 9 On the reproductive front, the IRS has ruled
that vasectomies, abortions, and sterilizations are forms of medical
care. 20
A few authorities have addressed IVF and surrogacy in the § 213
context. In Magdalin v. Commissioner,21 the Tax Court denied a single,
fertile man a deduction under § 213 for IVF expenses for an egg donor
and surrogate. 22 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed, explaining that such expenses were "[n]ot for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of [the] taxpayer's own body," but
rather "affected the bodies of the gestational carriers." 23 In Longino v.

15. Morrissey was unmarried at the time he incurred the expenses. He has since
married. Id. at 1272 n.1.
16. Rev. Rul. 82-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48.
17. Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81. Congress subsequently added section 213(d)(9),
which limits deductions to those cosmetic procedures that are "necessary to ameliorate a
deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury
resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease." I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2018).
18. I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(B) (transportation); § 213(d)(2) (lodging); § 213(d)(1)(D)
(insurance) (2018).
19. Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307; Rev. Rul. 68-295, 1968-1 C.B. 92.
20. Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (vasectomies and abortions); Rev. Rul. 73-603,
1973-2 C.B. 76 (female sterilization) (2018).
21. 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28966, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2009).
22. T.C. Memo. 2008-293.
23. Magdalin v. Commissioner, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28966, at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 17,
2009).
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Commissioner,24 the Tax Court denied a deduction to a male taxpayer for
his fianc6e's IVF treatments for the same reason. 25 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding that the taxpayer "had
presented no evidence that any of the alleged care involved him, his
spouse, or a dependent." 26 The IRS has, however, on at least one occasion
permitted a taxpayer to deduct expenses relating to a third-party egg
donor where the embryo was then implanted in the taxpayer's body. 27
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Morrissey's argument that § 213
permitted his claimed deduction. The court focused on the statutory
language, in particular the terms "affecting" and "function" in
§ 213(d)(1)(A).28 Turning to the dictionary, the circuit court decided that,
in order for the IVF treatment to "affect" a function of Morrissey's body,
it would have to "materially influenc[e] or alter[]" that function. 29 As for
"function," the court stated that that term "denotes a person's or thing's
unique task or role."3 0 Further, a "function of the body" should be read to

mean the function of a single, particular body, rather than a function
"achieved by the cooperation of multiple bodies."31 Morrissey's error, the
court explained, was to mistake "the entire reproductive process for his
own body's specific function within that process." 32 The court thereupon
pronounced that "[t]he male body's necessary function within the
reproductive process is simply stated: it must produce and provide
healthy sperm capable of fertilizing a female's egg." 33 As long as a male

body can contribute viable sperm, there is no functional impairment.
There being no argument that Morrissey had any functional impairment
of that nature, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 213 did not allow the
claimed deduction. 34
Having disposed of Morrissey's statutory argument, the court turned
to his constitutional claim. Morrissey argued that the IRS disallowance
of his claimed deduction should be subject to strict scrutiny because it

24. 593 F. App'x 965 (11th Cir. 2014).
25. T.C. Memo. 2013-80.
26. Longino, 593 F. App'x at 968.
27. PLR 200318017 (May 2, 2003). This ruling analogizes the procedure to the costs
incurred by the taxpayer for the medical expenses of a kidney donor, which was held to be
deductible in Rev. Rul. 68-452, 1968-2 C.B. 111.
28. Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1265.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1266.
34. Id. at 1267.
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infringes on a fundamental right-the right to reproduce. 35 Alternatively,
some level of heightened scrutiny should apply because the disallowance
discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation.3 6 That is, in
Morrissey's contention, the IRS's application of § 213 treats homosexual
and heterosexual taxpayers unequally.
The court conceded that Supreme Court precedents indicate that there
is, under some circumstances, a fundamental right to procreation, such
that the Constitution is implicated, but found no specific fundamental
right to procreation via IVF procedures. 37 These procedures, along with
surrogacy, are "decidedly modern phenomena" that, as the court noted,
raise serious ethical issues and risk bringing different rights into
conflict.38 The court mentioned that numerous states have wrestled with
the issue of what rights surrogates have in such arrangements. Because
there was no longstanding recognition of a right to IVF-assisted
procreation, and legislatures were still working through the conflicting
claims of participants in those procedures, the court declined to step in
and find a fundamental right to procreation through IVF.39 Thus, the
court rejected Morrissey's argument that strict scrutiny should apply to
the IRS's denial of his claimed deduction. 40
The court avoided directly addressing the question of whether some
level of heightened scrutiny applies to discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation because it determined that Morrissey had not been
treated differently than heterosexual taxpayers.41 First, the court noted
that the language of § 213 makes no distinction between homosexual and
heterosexual taxpayers. 42 Thus, there were no grounds for a facial
challenge to the statute. Second, the court stated that there was no
evidence that the IRS applied § 213 to Morrissey's claim for a deduction
any differently than the IRS has applied that section to heterosexual
taxpayers who have claimed similar IVF-related expenses. 43 As
mentioned, the two courts that have addressed this issue in relation to
heterosexual taxpayers (in Magdalin and Longino) have both held that §
213 did not permit such deductions. Moreover, the IRS issued guidance

35. Id. at 1268.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating
state law requiring sterilization of certain criminal offenders)).
38. Id. at 1269.
39. Id. at 1270.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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in 2002 stating that "medical expenses paid for a surrogate mother and
her unborn child would not qualify for deduction under

§ 213(a)."4 4 Thus,

Morrissey had not produced evidence to show that he had been treated
differently on account of his sexual orientation. 45
Morrissey stands as an example of how litigants are testing out the
extent of the courts' willingness to extend the rights guaranteed in recent
Supreme Court rulings relating to sexual orientation, most notably
47
Obergefell v. Hodges,4 6 which held that the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed a right to marriage to homosexual couples as well as to
heterosexual couples. 48 Given the statutory language of § 213, and the
existing authorities' disallowance of IVF and surrogacy deductions to
heterosexual taxpayers, the result in Morrissey was perhaps predictable.
II. BAYTAT V. COMMISSIONER

If Morrissey illustrates the intersection of the tax law and the
Battat v.
rights,
guarantees of fundamental
Constitution's
49
Eleventh
to
the
a
case
appealable
Commissioner gave the Tax Court, in
and the
law
the
tax
of
intersection
Circuit, the opportunity to address the
50
is
Battat
Constitution.
separation of powers doctrine embodied in the
and
unusual
in
the
Court
further interesting because it put the Tax
paradoxical position of ruling on the constitutionality of its own authority
to adjudicate disputes.
To understand how the dispute in Battat arose, it is necessary to
understand the basic historical evolution of the Tax Court from executive
agency to Article I court. The Tax Court has its origins in the Revenue
Act of 1924, which created the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) as an
executive branch agency.51 As an executive agency, the BTA consisted of
members appointed by, and removable by, the President. 52 Initially, the
President's removal power was limited to instances of "inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other reason." 53 The
President's removal power was further limited soon thereafter with the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

IRS INFO 2002-0291, 2002 WL 31991849 (Dec. 31, 2002).
Morrissey, 871 F.3d at 1270.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2588.
148 T.C. 2 (2017), appealfiled, No. 17-11646 (11th Cir. Apr. 11, 2017).
Id.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234 § 900(a).
Id. § 900(b).
Id.
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addition of a public hearing requirement in 1926.54 In 1942, the BTA was

renamed the "Tax Court of the United States," but remained an executive
branch agency.55 Due to its status as an executive branch agency, there
was initially no jurisdiction for Article III courts to review factual
determinations made by the BTA, so long as those determinations were
supported by any evidence in the record. 56 Amendments passed in 1948,
however, introduced appellate review of BTA decisions "in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil
actions tried without a jury."5 7 With this, the Tax Court could be seen as

a hybrid of an executive branch agency and a court. In 1969, Congress
renamed the court the "United States Tax Court" and removed the
statutory language indicating that the Tax Court was an "independent
agency in the Executive Branch of the Government."58 Instead, the Tax
Court was to be a "court of record" established "under Article I of the
Constitution of the United States."59 As the Senate Committee on
Finance explained in its report, "[s]ince the Tax Court has only judicial
duties, the committee believes it is anomalous to continue to classify it
with quasi-judicial executive agencies that have rulemaking and
investigatory functions."6 0 Thus, by 1969, the Tax Court seemed to have
shed most of the trappings of an executive branch agency.
Two years after the 1969 amendments, a taxpayer challenged the
constitutionality of the Tax Court, alleging that the "judicial powers" it
exercised were proper only to Article III courts.6 1 In affirming its
constitutionality, the Tax Court explained:
The basic jurisdiction of the Tax Court was not changed by the Tax
Reform Act [of 1969]. That basic jurisdiction is now limited to
redetermining deficiencies in Federal income, estate, and gift taxes, as
was the jurisdiction of the Tax Court of the United States and the
Board of Tax Appeals .... The Court presently has no jurisdiction to
execute its decisions; it does not render a monetary judgment; it simply
determines the amount of the deficiency or overpayment of tax. The
Tax Court has only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by statute.
It has no jurisdiction to exercise the broad common law concept of
"judicial power" invested in courts of general jurisdiction by Article III

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 951.
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619 § 504(a).
See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
Battat, 148 T.C. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id.
Kuretski v. Comm'r of IRS, 755 F.3d 929, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
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of the Constitution. If the jurisdiction and function presently vested in
the Tax Court could be exercised constitutionally by an "independent
agency within the Executive Branch," . . . there is little reason to
believe that Congress could not constitutionally delegate that
62
jurisdiction to a "legislative court."
Thus, because the Tax Court's jurisdiction was limited to so-called
"public rights" disputes, and those were not within the jurisdiction
granted to Article III courts under the Constitution, Congress was within
its Article I authority in creating the Tax Court.6 3 Two decades later, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the Tax Court was an Article I court that
"remains independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches." 64
Given the weight of statutory and judicial authority supporting the
Tax Court's status as an Article I court, rather than an Executive Branch
agency, it was perhaps inevitable that the President's continued
authority to remove Tax Court judges would produce controversy.
Indeed, in Kuretski v. Commissioner,65 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was tasked with determining
whether the President's removal authority violates separation of powers
principles. 66 If the answer is that it does violate the separation of powers,
then the very legitimacy of the Tax Court would be jeopardized. The D.C.
Circuit held that the Tax Court was within the Executive Branch, and
7
therefore there was no separation of powers issue to address.6
In avoiding the separation of powers issue in this way, however, the
D.C. Circuit seemingly brought itself into direct conflict with Congress's
expressed intent to have the Tax Court be an Article I court and the
Supreme Court's statement that the Tax Court "remains independent of
the Executive and Legislative Branches." 6 8 In fact, Congress responded
soon after the D.C. Circuit rendered Kuretski. In 2015, Congress
reinforced the Tax Court's independence from the executive branch,
adding to § 744169 the direct statement that "[t]he Tax Court is not an
agency of, and shall be independent of, the executive branch of the
70
Government."

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 396 (internal citations removed).
See id. at 399-400.
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 890-92 (1991).
755 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id., aff'g T.C. Memo. 2012-262.
Kuretski, 755 F.3d at 938-42.
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891.
I.R.C. § 7441 (2018).
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div.

Q, § 441

(2015).
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Enter the taxpayers in Battat, who raised again the issues argued in
Kuretski about the constitutionality of the President's authority to
remove Tax Court judges. As in Kuretski, the Battat taxpayers argued
that § 7443(f),71 which authorizes the President to remove Tax Court
judges "after notice and opportunity for public hearing, for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause," 72 marks
an unconstitutional breach of the separation of powers, and that the Tax
Court should declare § 7443(f) unconstitutional. 73 Further, given the
unconstitutionality of the statute, the taxpayers sought "rulings that all
Tax Court Judges must recuse themselves from deciding any further
cases." 74 Given the recent amendment of

§ 7441,

the answer provided by

Kuretski to these questions was undoubtedly unavailable to the court in
Battat.
As a preliminary matter, addressing these issues put the Tax Court in
a paradoxical position: if it ruled in favor of the taxpayer, it would be
ruling that its judges lacked the authority to rule at all in the case. The
Tax Court noted, however, that "[c]ourts have occasionally been
presented with issues in which all judges of the court have a conflict of
interest or are alleged to be biased, and, because it is necessary for the
work of the court to proceed, have not recused themselves." 75 This
resolution, called the "Rule of Necessity," the Tax Court summarized
with the "maxim of law that where all are disqualified, none are
disqualified."76 The Tax Court concluded that under the Rule of
Necessity, it was able to exercise its jurisdiction to decide if § 7443(f) is
77
unconstitutional and if the Tax Court judges must recuse themselves.
Turning to the substance of the taxpayers' claim, the Tax Court framed
the question as follows: "[d]oes providing to the President the authority
to remove Tax Court Judges give the President any unconstitutional
power to interfere with the Article III judicial power of the United
States?"7 8 The court held that the answer is that it does not, employing a

public rights rationale similar to the doctrine that the Tax Court
79
employed in Burns, Stix Friedman& Co. v. Commissioner. This public
rights doctrine takes as its starting point that Article III courts are only

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

I.R.C. § 7443(f) (2018).
Battat, 148 T.C. at *2.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *24.
Id. at *25.
Id.
Id. at *25-26.
Id. at *27.
57 T.C. 392 (1971); Battat, 148 T.C. at *27-29.
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granted exclusive jurisdiction over "suit[s] at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty."80 However, under the historical doctrine of
sovereign immunity, those courts lacked jurisdiction over the sovereign.81
Because the sovereign could not be sued in those courts (except insofar
as it consented to be sued), matters involving "public rights"-disputes
with the government--could be adjudicated in non-Article III courts. 82
The Tax Court noted that a long line of Supreme Court precedents have
established that "controversies 'between the government and others'
involve public rights and thus may be removed from Article III courts
and delegated to Article I courts or administrative agencies for their
determination." 83 Further, "[t]he Tax Court decides only disputes
between the sovereign and the subject which are neither suits at common
law, nor in equity, nor admiralty." 84
Thus, for the President's removal authority to violate the separation
of powers, it would have to be shown that it "could interfere with 'the
constitutionally assigned mission of' the judicial branch." 85 However,
given that the jurisdiction of the Tax Court is limited to the adjudication
of public rights, "if the President sought to exercise the power to remove
a Tax Court Judge, the President would not thereby be affecting any
matter within the portion of the 'judicial Power of the United States' that
is necessarily exercised by Article III judges." 86

The Tax Court further backstopped its ruling, noting that
"[i]nterbranch
removal
is
not
necessarily
constitutionally
impermissible."87 In support, the Tax Court cited Mistretta v. United
States,88 wherein the Supreme Court noted that it was incorrect to read
its precedents as "suggest[ing] that one Branch may never exercise
removal power, however limited, over members of another Branch.
Indeed, we already have recognized that the President may remove a
judge who serves on an Article I court."8 9 The Supreme Court was
referring to McAllister v. United States,90 which permitted the President
to remove a judge who was serving a four-year term as a district judge

80. Battat, 148 T.C. at *27.
81. Id. at *28-29.
82. Id. at *27.

83. Id. at *30.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411 n.35 (1989)).
Id. at *3031.
Id. at *31.
488 U.S. 361 (1989).
Battat, 148 T.C. at *31 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 411 n.35).
141 U.S. 174 (1891).
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for the District of Alaska.9 1 At that time, Alaska was still a territory and
the district judges were appointed under the authority of Article I rather
than Article 111.92

In deciding that the President's removal authority over Tax Court
judges did not violate the separation of powers, Battat provided what is
likely to be a more enduring resolution to this issue than was provided in
Kuretski. The Battat holding comports more closely with the clear intent
Congress has expressed with regard to the status of the Tax Court, as
well as Supreme Court precedents on the separation of powers.
Nonetheless, the taxpayers in Battat have appealed their case to the
Eleventh Circuit.
III. MIHELIK V. UNITED STATES

Finally, in what appears to be a case of first impression, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida determined that
a payment made by a taxpayer under a separation agreement that
93
related to litigation that began during the marriage was nondeductible.
The taxpayer was formerly married to Michael Bluso, who was
employed by a family-owned corporation of which he was the majority
shareholder. 94 During the pendency of divorce proceedings, Bluso was
sued by his sister, Pamela Barnes, who was a minority shareholder of the
corporation. Barnes alleged that Bluso had used his control of the
corporation to pay himself an excessive salary to the detriment of the
95

corporation.
While the litigation was still ongoing, the taxpayer and Bluso entered
96
One of the
into a separation agreement (the Separation Agreement).
provisions of the Separation Agreement noted the existence of potential
liability under the lawsuit and stated that any such liability would be
considered a marital liability and that the taxpayer and Bluso "will be
jointly and severally liable for all damages, costs, attorney fees and other
expenses incurred in this litigation by [Bluso,] which is a marital
liability."9 7 This provision was apparently contested during the divorce
proceedings, but the taxpayer ultimately agreed to include it. Sometime
after the divorce, the litigation was settled, with Bluso agreeing to pay

91. Id.
92. Id. at 185-86.
93. Mihelick v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167897 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2017),
appeal filed, No. 17-14975 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2017).
94. Id. at *1-2.
95. Id. at *1-4.
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id. at *3 (quoting Separation Agreement).

1178

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

$600,000 to Barnes to resolve the excess compensation claim.98 As
required by the Separation Agreement, the taxpayer paid $300,000 to
Bluso for her share of the settlement payment.99
The taxpayer filed a refund claim on the basis of the payment. The
taxpayer argued that the payment was deductible under § 165(c)(2)100 as
a loss relating to an activity carried on for profit. 101 The taxpayer further
argued that the favorable rules of § 1341102 should apply to the
deduction.103 Under that section, certain restorations of income held
under a "claim of right" get beneficial tax treatment. 104 More specifically,
if a taxpayer includes income in one year because "it appeared that the
taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the item," but if a deduction is
subsequently allowed because it is established that the taxpayer did not
have an unrestricted right to the income, then the taxpayer generally
calculates the tax benefit of the deduction under § 1341.105 The § 1341
rules are intended to deal with certain inequities that can arise from
year-by-year tax accounting. If, based on the facts known at the end of a
taxable year, a taxpayer appears to have earned income, that income is
taxed. Even if later events demonstrate that income was not truly
earned, year-by-year tax accounting precludes a retrospective
adjustment to the original return. Instead, the taxpayer is stuck
reporting income in the earlier year and a deduction in the later year. In
many cases, this can produce unfair results for the taxpayer, who may be
unable to benefit from the later deduction for various reasons.106 In lieu
of this treatment, § 1341 effectively provides a tax credit in lieu of the
deduction in an amount equal to the tax that was originally paid on the
affected income. In most cases, this treatment produces a more beneficial
outcome for the taxpayer.
The government made two arguments to deny the taxpayer's refund
claim. First, the government claimed that the $300,000 payment was not
deductible by the taxpayer. 10 7 Deductibility under another provision of
98. Id. at *4.

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (2018).
Mihelik, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167897, at *9.
I.R.C. § 1341 (2018).

103. Mihelik, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167897, at *6-7.

104. I.R.C. § 1341(a) (2018).
105. Mihelik, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167897, at *7.
106. For example, expenses relating to the trade or business of being an employee are
subject to various limitations, which could reduce or eliminate the benefit of the later
deduction.
107. United States' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Mihelick v. United States, No.
2:16-cv-741 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 47.
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the Code is a precondition to favorable treatment under § 1341. As noted
above, the taxpayer based her deduction on § 165(c)(2) of the Code, which
relates to losses on transactions entered into for profit. The government
argued that the payment was voluntarily agreed to by the taxpayer in
connection with the divorce settlement. 0 8 Personal expenses, including
"costs paid in connection with a divorce [or] separation," are not
deductible.109 A key fact supporting this argument was that only Bluso
was a defendant in the Barnes litigation.11 0 It appears that the taxpayer's
only exposure to the litigation was its indirect effect on the assets in the
marital estate. She was not, it seems, exposed to a direct judgment.
Second, the government argued that, even if the payment were
deductible, § 1341 should not apply, since the payment was not
sufficiently related to the earlier income inclusion."' The government
relied on Tax Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent that required a
"substantive nexus" between the original income and the subsequent
deduction before § 1341 treatment would apply.11 2 The government relied
on the fact that the taxpayer's payment was made under the Separation
Agreement, which arose out of the taxpayer's divorce proceedings and
had nothing to do with Bluso's employment.11 3 The government also
pointed out that the taxpayer voluntarily entered into the Separation
Agreement.114

The district court agreed with the government that the payment was
not deductible under § 165 and, accordingly did not reach the question of
§ 1341's applicability.115 The court reasoned that the Separation
Agreement was a "private settlement" and that the taxpayer did not have
any personal obligation from the Barnes litigation." 6 Moreover, the
taxpayer herself was not engaged in a relevant trade or business or any
other profit-oriented transaction that could sustain the loss.1 17 One open
question is whether the court would have arrived at a different
conclusion if the taxpayer was a co-defendant in the lawsuit and made
the payment in that capacity, rather than under the settlement
agreement.
108. Id. at 6-7.
109. I.R.C. § 262 (2018); Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (2018).
110. United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 107, at 6-7.
111. Id. at8.
112. See Batchelor-Robjohns v. United States, 788 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2015); Blanton
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 527 (1966).
113. United States' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 107, at 9-10.
114. Id. at 10-11.
115. Mihelik, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167897, at *10-11.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Although the court did not address the issue, it implicitly refused to
allow the taxpayer to rely on Bluso's trade or business of being employed
by the corporation during the period when they were married and filing
a joint return. Presumably, Bluso deducted at least his 50% share of the
payment to Barnes and may well have deducted the entire $600,000.
Given that the taxes originally imposed on Bluso's salary were borne by
the couple jointly and that the settlement payment to Barnes was borne
equally under the Separation Agreement, the court's decision arguably
creates an unjust hardship for the taxpayer, who was taxed on $300,000
of income that was ultimately not retained.
Even if the court had permitted the taxpayer to "step into the shoes"
of Bluso for purposes of establishing a trade or business, the court did not
reach the issue but the government made arguments on this front as
well.118 Recall that § 1341 requires that a deduction be allowed because
it is "established" that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to
an item that was previously included in income. In this case, the taxpayer
would have needed to establish that a deduction allowable to her as a
result of the payment under the Separation Agreement was ultimately
allowed because the Barnes litigation "established" that Bluso did not
have an unrestricted right to wages paid to him by the corporation. While
this chain of reasoning is certainly plausible, there is a significant degree
of attenuation between the payment giving rise to the deduction and the
original inclusion of income. The Mihelick decision has been appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit.

118. Id. at *7 n.3.

